Over at Rare, I try to lay out some reasons that conservatives should be open to negotiations with Iran:
No nuclear deal will be perfect, and it would certainly be preferable for Iran to have no centrifuges and to come clean about all its past nuclear activities. But conservatives have always taken special pride in their emphasis on what is possible, not what is ideal. We do not let the perfect become the enemy of the good.
Conservative presidents from Eisenhower to the elder Bush made prudence the lodestar of their foreign policies. An Iran deal is in their tradition: a practical, restrained compromise that conservatives can embrace.
Read the rest here. As always, most of my writing can be found at The National Interest.
With the Iran talks extended yesterday evening for another four months (to the one year anniversary of the Joint Plan being signed, but conveniently also a few weeks after America’s midterm elections), I weighed in at the Huffington Post on how we should think of one of the key remaining issues: unresolved questions about Iran’s past nuclear-weapons research. The allegations are disturbing, the IAEA believes the evidence is credible, and Iran has not only not been fully forthcoming, it’s engaged in apparent coverups. But, I argue, a strong verification program centered around the enrichment phase of the nuclear process will be the core of the deal, and we can toughen our line there to hedge against what weaponization progress we think Iran’s made. After all, no highly enriched uranium, no bomb.
As always, you can still find most of my new work at The National Interest. (Make sure to check out my defense of the Iran deal in the April/May issue.) I’m also active most days on my Twitter. But for those looking, I’ve had two recent essays appear in other venues.
Over at The Diplomat on April 16, I looked at Russia’s threats to invade Ukraine. A Swedish defense study, I pointed out, suggests that the Russians would be overextending themselves if they did go in. They’d have less flexibility in other areas, including the Chinese frontier. There are real dangers associated with that – for example, the Swedes suggest Moscow might lean more on its nuclear deterrent. However, it could present an opportunity for America to play Russia and China off one another if Russia’s principal anxieties are once again in the East. It’s not clear we’re strategically positioned to take advantage of such an opportunity, however.
At Real Clear World on April 25, I tried to establish an upper bound for the role of experts in the U.S. foreign-policy process. “Just do what the country experts think” is actually not the best option, because a) expert communities do not agree, and indeed are prone to many of the same failings policymakers are and b) leaning on country experts for policy risks failing to incorporate a policy’s impacts on other countries or to adjust for its domestic elements. (Daniel Larison replied to the piece here.) I also offered some more detail on the dynamics of expert communities in this series of tweets.
Over at The National Interest‘s Buzz blog, I discuss the implications of a newly-introduced piece of legislation that would call for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to be indicted for inciting genocide. While Ahmadinejad certainly deserves scorn and isolation (and I expect his speech tomorrow at the General Assembly to remind us of that, although perhaps less than in prior years), all moves against Iran are not automatically smart moves. S.Res.574 is among the less-smart moves. There are issues beyond the ones I discuss in the Buzz post that I’d like to elaborate on more here.
Within Iran, the principlist faction (more or less Iran’s neoconservatives) won rhetorical battles with the reformist camp by arguing that reformist diplomatic initiatives had given the West concessions but yielded nothing–the Khatami Administration, for instance, offered the U.S. some cooperation in Afghanistan, voluntarily stopped elements of the nuclear program, and attempted to start a “dialogue between civilizations,” yet left office having been branded a member of the axis of evil and facing increased risk of international sanctions. If this is how the international community responds to concessions, say the principlists, why make them? Why negotiate when the conclusions of negotiation are predetermined and unfavorable? A key element of this rhetoric of late has been the “injustice” of the international system (Iranian leaders are eager to point out that the Security Council is structured on power, not democratic principles) and Iran as a primary victim of international injustice. Indicting Ahmadinejad would confirm this narrative and strengthen the hand of the most anti-diplomatic camps of the principlists; it would not help the reformists much, as many already regard Ahmadinejad as a criminal.
There is a second troubling matter–taking legal action against a foreign head of state. This is morally satisfying, but the world is full of unpleasant leaders, and sometimes America must work with them. Our dirtier allies will not appreciate a sudden American friendliness with international judicial regimes; dirty leaders on the fence about relations with America may see a moralistic foreign policy as a sign that they would be better off with American rivals like Russia or China that are more committed to a mind-your-own-business Westphalian international system.
Of course, as I suggest at TNI, S.Res.574 is not likely to have any serious impact–among other things, the Senate has not ratified the Rome Statute, which founded the same International Criminal Court that the Senate is calling on to try Ahmadinejad. The international community is likely to pay little attention to a nonbinding resolution in the Senate, which the same day began processing a resolution “congratulating the Nunaka Valley Little League Junior girls softball team on winning the 2012 Little League Junior Softball World Series” and two days later to congratulate itself for “the 50th anniversary of the signing of Public Law 87-788, an Act commonly known as the McIntire-Stennis Cooperative Forestry Act.” S.Res.574 is little more than election year pablum.
Over at The Diplomat, I have a piece on the important argument made by former Pakistani Ambassador Husain Haqqan that the U.S. and Pakistan should end their “marriage” for mutual benefit. A key American objection to this is nuclear security–namely, shouldn’t the U.S. cultivate relations with Pakistan so it can increase the likelihood that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will fall into the wrong hands.
Much can be said of Saudi Arabia’s economic problems–the inequity, particularly affecting the Shia and women, the dependence on imported labor, the existence of widespread poverty in a land of enormous prosperity, etc. In a piece for the National Interest, I examine the broader problem–the way massive oil revenues and a massive bureaucracy combine to create severe distortions and stifle private economic activity. Despite its enormous resources, the Kingdom has developed a weak and fragile economy. It’s not clear that there’s a solution to this, as the economy of the state and the politics of the state are intrinsically linked (for a much deeper and more technical treatment than I could hope to provide, check out Steffen Hertog’s Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats). By shaping this economy and leaving the education system in the hands of the clerics, the House of Saud has made itself necessary. It has made–probably in part by accident–a society too conservative, too contradictory, and too economically feeble to replace them without creating severe instability.
Over at the National Interest’s media critique blog, the Buzz, I argue that Tom Friedman was wrong to say that Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi should be ashamed of himself for his four hour visit to Tehran for the Non-Aligned Movement summit. (I don’t want to be accused of piling on, so I will note that I thought Friedman was wrong before Morsi ripped Iran’s support of Assad). While Morsi’s trip, and the associated attempt to form a new Syria contact group composed of regional states, will likely have little real impact, it’s an important signal that Egypt is back in the Arab world’s political scene.
My July 3 National Interest piece argued that Iran stands to waste a huge pile of money if they attempt to develop nuclear submarines. Iran is clearly using the subs as an excuse to lawfully boost enrichment above the current 19.75% level. They have also suggested that problems fueling their ships abroad may lead them to develop nuclear powered commercial vessels . . . I have not done the math but I am suspecting these would carry enormous opportunity costs that would take years to pay off, if they can be paid off at all. Hints are already coming out that a higher level of enrichment could be in the cards–most recently, a Khamenei aide stated that if international pressure continues, Iran may move up to 56% enrichment. Western negotiators should latch on to this matter. Higher enrichment is not necessary for naval reactors–it’s merely preferable–and Iran does not have good reasons to develop nuclear vessels anyway. While we shouldn’t get too hasty and say this all means Iran really is going for the bomb, it does shred the common Iranian refrain that the purpose of the nuclear program is fully peaceful and aimed only at economic and scientific advancement. The current levels and rates of enrichment make this scarcely plausible (Iran claims it is making the 19.75% enriched uranium for, among other things, fuel for an array of yet-to-be-constructed research reactors). Higher enrichment makes Iran’s multiple goals quite clear.
On July 23, I weighed in for MENASAWorld on the accusations that the Secretary of State’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Huma Abedin, is a secret Muslim Brotherhood infiltrator. Since the strangeness of this claim was already exposed in depth by heftier writers than me, I took a different angle, arguing that with or without legions of Muslim secret agents, the United States would have opened up to the Muslim Brotherhood. Brotherhood secret agents, incidentally, are easily spotted: most will be in regular contact with a cleric about whether taking a cyanide pill during Ramadan would break the fast or whether it is unclean to use a shoe phone.
On July 31 I suggested in the National Interest that Western observers are mistakenly viewing the Syrian civil war as a war of national liberation in which the displacement of the regime will be welcomed by all sectors of society. In fact, I suggest, the fall of Damascus will merely mean that the rebels now have the upper hand in the conflict, and not that it is anywhere close to over. The mutual distaste that has sprung up between sects friendly with Assad and those friendly with the opposition will make reconciliation extremely difficult. If the rebels can drive him from the capital, Assad will retreat behind the mountains of the Syrian coast and hold off further advances by the Free Army.
Check out my piece in The National Interest:
The emergence of an elective presidency in Egypt will essentially be the rise of a third branch of government. There is an enormous institutional potential here. While the president will be forced to carve out authority from the two older branches, the position will come with enormous weight. A capable president could play the older branches off each other and force them to resolve their tensions via appeals to the public. Ultimately, the president would aim to eliminate the old executive, returning the military to a quieter role in politics and consolidating his power. All this would be enormously beneficial to the development of a legitimate and democratic government in Egypt.
In spite of the complex political and social forces the revolution unleashed, the Egyptian on the street now faces an unpalatable binary choice: a Thermidorian turn to the old elite or increased authority for the deeply controversial Islamist party.
Commentary: Egypt’s Democratic Hopes Imperiled | The National Interest.
Crazier ideas have worked before. The Israeli security sector is very uneasy with what’s happening right now across the Golan. Bashar al Assad and his father Hafez have never been friendly, but the Israel-Syria conflict has long been stabilized and fought through proxies. There’s a worry that the fall of the House of Assad will yield more urgent tension–at best, a fledgling government may attempt to shore up support by getting pushy about the Golan Heights. At worst, they see a small chance that Israel will have unstable Islamist governments in its two historic state rivals, plus Hezbollah on its northern border. What can Israel do to prevent that unhappy geopolitical outcome? More than you’d think.